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Abstract
The Trump phenomenon is argued to depart from current pop-
ulist rise in Europe. According to a model of opinion dynamics from
sociophysics the machinery of Trump’s amazing success obeys well-
defined counter-intuitive rules. Therefore, his success was in principle
predictable from the start. The model uses local majority rule argu-
ments and obeys a threshold dynamics. The associated tipping points
are found to depend on the leading collective beliefs, cognitive biases
and prejudices of the social group which undertakes the public debate.
And here comes the sesame of the Trump campaign, which develops
along two successive steps. During a first moment, Trump’s statement
produces a majority of voters against him. But at the same time, ac-
cording to the model the shocking character of the statement modifies
the prejudice balance. In case the prejudice is present even being
frozen among voters, the tipping point is lowered at Trump’s bene-
fit. Nevertheless, although the tipping point has been lowered by the
activation of frozen prejudices it is instrumental to preserve enough
support from openly prejudiced people to be above the threshold.
∗serge.galam@sciencespo.fr
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Then, as infuriated voters launch intense debate, occurrence of ties
will drive progressively hostile people to shift their voting intention
without needing to endorse the statement which has infuriated them.
The on going debate does drive towards a majority for Trump. The
possible Trump victory at November Presidential election is discussed.
In particular, the model shows that to eventually win the Presidential
election, Trump must not modify his past shocking attitude but to ap-
peal to a different spectrum of frozen prejudices, which are common
to both Democrats and Republicans.
Keywords: Donald Trump; US presidential election; sociophysics.
1 Introduction
The current American campaign for both Democratic and Republican presi-
dential nominations has gone through a series of successive unexpected out-
comes. Not many experts and analysts had imagined that Bernie Sanders
would do so well against Hillary Clinton. Even less would have bet on Don-
ald Trump nomination till the last moment before the Republican National
Convention.
When the Republican Party primaries for the 2016 United states presi-
dential election started, most analysts were explaining with very sound ar-
guments that Trump candidacy was a volatile phenomenon, which will very
soon collapse.
Indeed, Trump nomination by the Republican party on July 22, 2016
has come as a total disclaimer to all analysts, who had kept predicting the
eventual collapse of Trump, election after election during the primaries. It
was supposed to be a temporal phenomenon and accordingly should have
faded away at some point during the campaign. View as a political bubble,
before almost each primary or caucus election, commentators were prompt
to announce its coming burst. Instead, Trump kept on winning delegates till
reaching the official nomination, turning previous predictions as pure wishful
thinking.
After having gained the Republican nomination, Trump could well dismiss
again most predictions by defeating Clinton on November election. Yet, his
first success still needs a rational explanation besides denoting it as either
an improbable accident or the expression of a rejection of the elite agenda.
Many questions need to be answered like the following ones:
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(i) How come Trump has succeeded in gaining so many states in contra-
diction with solid and sound analyses?
(ii) How come Trump has defied pundits and usurped the Grand Old
Party (GOP) establishment?
(iii) How come Trump has succeeded to get 16 starting competitors to
drop out the campaign?
(iiii) How come Trump made his most serious rival Ted Cruz to give up
the race for nomination?
All these questions are linked to the main puzzle of Trump campaign: How
come Trump kept infuriating and outraging a large spectrum of Republican
voters by iterating a series of unacceptable shocking statements and at the
same time he got a majority of these people to eventually vote for him? It
is this paradoxical singularity which has to be elucidated to understand the
rationale behind Trump phenomenon.
To solve this enigma, I appeal to a model of opinion dynamics I have
been developing for more than thirty years within the frame of so-called
sociophysics [1, 2]. Denoted the Local Majority Rule (LMR) or the Majority
Rule (MJ) or the Sequential Majority Rule (SMR) or the Galam model [3, 4,
5, 37, 7]. It articulates around three main points, which will be enumerated
in next Section.
The LMR model is found to obey a threshold dynamics. For two compet-
ing opinions, the simplest case of homogeneous agents exhibits two attractors
separated by a tipping point. When all discussing groups are odd, i.e., a local
majority always exists and the tipping point is perfectly democratic, located
at fifty percent. However in case of even size groups, breaking the tie at the
benefit of one opinion suppresses the democratic balance at the advantage of
that opinion. The associated tipping points can go down as low as 15% to
25% for the opinion in tune with the leading belief while jumping at 85% or
75% for the competing other opinion.
These threshold values are found to depend on the current distribution of
collective beliefs and cognitive biases of the social group which undertakes the
public debate. The question of which are the leading beliefs and prejudices
activated in case of a local doubt is instrumental to understand the machinery
of Trump amazing dynamics. There lies the key power of Trump campaign
with his capacity to modify the current balance of active prejudices at his
benefit.
Applying the LMR model abruptly to the American campaign for the Re-
publican nomination would have yielded a priori the conclusion that Donald
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Trump candidacy will be defeated by more traditional Republican candidates
like for instance Cruz, in accordance to most analyses. However, by making
his repeated shocking statements Trump succeeded to accomplish two con-
tradictory outcomes. The first one is visible and concerns the truly massive
outrage produced among a good part of Republican voters. This effect results
in producing a majority against Trump preserving only a small minority of
support by people who do share the statement content. The second outcome
concerns the leading prejudice among a majority of Republican voters.
By outraging people, Trump awakes at the same time frozen prejudices
which are connected to the content of indignation. On this ground, infuriated
people who condemn Trump statement want to argue with others to affirm
and legitimize their stand. However, they engage in a public debate being
unaware of the activation of a frozen prejudice they indeed truly reject but
only conscientiously standing against the associated statement. This is an
instrumental hypothesis of our analysis. On this ground, once the debate is
launched, people start to shift opinion with an eventual reversing of majority
in favor of Trump provided his rescaled initial support value is above the
threshold value. This initial support is made of the small minority of openly
prejudiced people.
The LMR model provides a clear ground to explain such a counter-
intuitive mechanism. Therefore, Trump’s success was in principle predictable
from the start. Accordingly, Trump phenomenon departs from current pop-
ulist rise in Europe like with Marine Le Pen of the National Front in France
and Nigel Farage of the UK Independence party. It is a singular phenomenon
which relies on the existence of frozen prejudices which are well locked by
the people who share them against their conscious will.
The methodological approach used in this article subscribes to the novel
sociophysics trend, which is developing among physicists at the level of in-
ternational research [8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22,
23, 24, 25, 26]. Recently mathematicians are also getting involved in the
mathematical modeling of social phenomena [27, 28]. Sociophysics has been
also applied to model terrorism [29, 31, 30, 32] and war [33, 34]. While socio-
physics is today a flourishing field, it was strongly criticized among physicists
at its earlier steps [35].
It is worth to stress that while sociophysics is still at its earlier stage
of construction, some real world events have been successfully predicted.
Among others, voting outcomes like the 2005 French No victory for the Eu-
ropean constitution referendum [37] the 2002 victory of JM LePen at the first
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run of French presidential election [38] as well as the repetition of fifty-fifty
votes in democratic societies following the 2000 Bush-Gore election in the
US [39].
More recently the Brexit vote which came as a total blow to all ana-
lysts, was envisioned in 2004 using the LMR model [37] with the following
concluding statement:
“Applying our results to the European Union leads to the con-
clusion that it would be rather misleading to initiate large public
debates in most of the involved countries. Indeed, even starting
from a huge initial majority of people in favor of the European
Union, an open and free debate would lead to the creation of huge
majority hostile to the European Union. This provides a strong
ground to legitimize the on-going reluctance of most European
governments to hold referendum on associated issues.”
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Next Section presents the
Local Majority Rule (LMR) model of opinion dynamics.Tipping points are
discussed in Section 3 while Section 4 presents a general illustration of the
dynamics which exhibits counter intuitive results. The Trump paradoxical
sesame is given an instrumental explanation in Section 5. The question of
whether or not Trump will be the next US president at the November, 2016
election, is given some answer in Section 6. In particular, the model shows
that to eventually win the Presidential election Trump does not need to mod-
ify his past shocking attitude but to appeal to a different spectrum of frozen
prejudices, which are common to both Democrats and Republicans.The con-
clusion contains several clarifying statements about the implications of this
work and the meaning of making an either successful or wrong prediction.
2 The Local Majority Rule Model
The LMR model articulates around three successive steps, which are iterated
several times in a row.
1. First step: distribute the agents randomly in different groups of small
sizes from 1 up to an upper limit usually equal to 5 or 6.
2. Second step: apply a local majority rule within each single group to
update all agent choices along the choice which got the majority of
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votes. In case of an even size group at a tie update along one choice
with probability k and the other with probability (1− k). The current
value of k is a function of the actual leading prejudice and belief within
the associated social group.
3. Third step: reshuffle all the agents and restart from step 1.
For situations where two choices A and B are competing with respective
initial supports p0 and (1 − p0), one series of steps 1-2-3 shifts p0 to a new
value p1. After n iterations, we get a proportion pn. In order to evaluate
quantitatively the successive changes of respective supports for A and B we
calculate p1 as
p1 ≡ PT (p0) =
L∑
r=1
arPr(p0), (1)
where ar is the proportion of groups of size r with the constraint
∑L
r=1 ar = 1
and Pr is the probability to have a group of r agents (size r) being updated
along choice A. L is the largest size of local groups, usually around 5 or 6.
Larger groups tend to fragment spontaneously into smaller subgroups. More
precisely, for any size r, both odd and even, the voting function Pr writes
Pr(p0) =
r∑
m=N [ r
2
]
(
r
m
)
pm0 (1− p0)r−m
+ kδ
[
r
2
−N
[
r
2
] ](
r
r
2
)
p
r
2
0 (1− p0)
r
2 , (2)
where
(
r
m
)
≡ r!
m!(r−m)!
, k is an integer with 0 ≤ k ≤ 1, N [x] ≡ Integer part
of x and δ[x] is the Kronecker function, i.e., δ[x] = 1 if x = 0 and δ[x] = 0 if
x 6= 0.
First term in Eq. (2) accounts for local majorities with configurations
{rA, 0B}, {(r − 1)A, 1B}, {(r − 2)A, 2B}... , {(N
[
r
2
]
+ 1)A, (N
[
r
2
]
− 1)B}
while second term contribution is produced from a tie at an even size group
with { r
2
A, r
2
B}.
There, the factor k breaks the symmetry between both choices. At a tie,
with as many arguments for one choice as for the other, the group get trapped
into a collective doubt. In this situation all agents chose A with probability
k and B with probability (1−k). Only k = 1
2
restores the symmetry between
A and B.
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It is worth to stress that any odd size r yields { r
2
−N [ r
2
]} = 1
2
making the
Kronecker function always equals to zero in Eq. (2) thus canceling the second
term. For even r size { r
2
−N [ r
2
]} = 0 with last term equal to k
(
r
r
2
)
p
r
2
0 (1−p0) r2 .
Eq. (2) can thus simply be written in two different expressions
Pr(p0) ≡
r∑
m= r+1
2
(
r
m
)
pm0 (1− p0)r−m, (3)
for odd sizes r, and
Pr(p0) ≡
r∑
m= r
2
+1
(
r
m
)
pm0 (1− p0)r−m + k
(
r
r
2
)
p
r
2
0 (1− p0)
r
2 , (4)
when r is even. Note that the summation term is identical to Eq. (3) besides
for the summation first term which is r
2
+ 1 instead of r+1
2
for the odd case.
In the simplest case r = 3, Eq. (3) writes
P3(p0) = p
3
0 + 3p
2
0(1− p0), (5)
which accounts for all local A majority within a group of 3 agents {3A, 0B}
and {2A, 1B}. The multiplicative factor 3 in last term accounts for the three
possibilities to place one B among two A.
In contrast, r = 4 yields from Eq. (4)
P4(p0) = p
4
0 + 4p
3
0(1− p0) + 6kp20(1− p0)2, (6)
which includes both local majorities with {4A, 0B} and {3A, 1B} and the
tie {2A, 2B}.
For instance, for p0 = 0.450 > 0.500 Eqs. (3) and (4) yield p1 =
0.203 + 0.495k, 0.425, 0.241 + 0.368k, 0.407, 0.255 + 0.303k for respectively
r = 2, 3, 4, 5, 6. The series turns to p1 = 0.698, 0.425, 0.609, 0.407, 0.558 for
k = 1. Associated values are exhibited in Figure (1).
It is seen that odd sizes yield always values lower than 0.45. The larger
the size, the larger the amplitude from 0.45. In contrast, up to r = 14 even
sizes yield values higher then 0.45. Contrary to odd sizes, the larger the size,
the smaller the amplitude from 0.45. From r = 16 and up the behavior is
similar to odd sizes. By reversed symmetry k = 0 gives p1 = 0.203, 0.425,
0.241, 0.407, 0.255. Figure (2) shows the behavior of p1 at k = 1 and r = 4
as a function of p0 in the full range 0 ≤ p0 ≤ 1.
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Table 1: The single group voting outcome p1 is displayed for
respectively p0 = 0.100, 0.200, 0.300, 0.400, 0.450, 0.480, 0.500, 0.520,
0.550, 0.600, 0.700, 0.800, 0.900 using r = 2, 3, 4, 5, 6. Data are rounded at
three digits.
p0 p1, r = 2 p1, r = 3 p1, r = 4 p1, r = 5 p1, r = 6
0.100 0.010 + 0.180 k 0.028 0.004 + 0.049 k 0.009 0.001 + 0.015 k
0.200 0.040 + 0.320 k 0.104 0.027 + 0.154 k 0.058 0.017 + 0.082 k
0.300 0.090 + 0.420 k 0.216 0.084 + 0.265 k 0.163 0.070 + 0.185 k
0.400 0.160 + 0.480 k 0.352 0.179 + 0.346 k 0.317 0.179 +0.276 k
0.450 0.203 + 0.495 k 0.425 0.241 + 0.368 k 0.407 0.255 + 0.303 k
0.480 0.230 + 0.499 k 0.470 0.283 + 0.374 k 0.463 0.307 + 0.311 k
0.500 0.250 + 0.500 k 0.500 0.313 + 0.375 k 0.500 0.344 + 0.313 k
0.520 0.270 + 0.499 k 0.530 0.343 + 0.374 k 0.537 0.382 + 0.311 k
0.550 0.303 + 0.495 k 0.575 0.391 + 0.368 k 0.593 0.442 + 0.303 k
0.600 0.360 + 0.480 k 0.648 0.475 + 0.346 k 0.683 0.544 + 0.276 k
0.700 0.490 + 0.420 k 0.784 0.652 + 0.265 k 0.837 0.744 + 0.185 k
0.800 0.640 + 0.320 k 0.896 0.819 + 0.154 k 0.942 0.901 + 0.082 k
0.900 0.810 + 0.180 k 0.972 0.948 + 0.049 k 0.991 0.984 + 0.015 k
On the other side of the democratic threshold, p0 = 0.550 > 0.500 gives
p1 = 0.303 + 0.495k, 0.575, 0.391 + 0.368k, 0.593, 0.442 + 0.303k for r =
2, 3, 4, 5, 6. It turns to p1 = 0.798, 0.575, 0.759, 0.593, 0.745 for k = 1 against
p1 = 0.303, 0.575, 0.391, 0.593, 0.442 when k = 0.
Table (1) shows the various values of p1 obtained for respectively p0 =
0.100, 0.200, 0.300, 0.400, 0.450, 0.480, 0.500, 0.520, 0.550, 0.600, 0.700, 0.800, 0.900
using for each value, r = 2, 3, 4, 5, 6. Results are rounded at three digits. All
these illustrations show clearly that odd sizes respect a democratic balance
with always p1 > p0 when p0 > 0.500 and p1 < p0 when p0 < 0.500. In
contrast, even size can increase a minority value with p1 > p0 for p0 < 0.500
and p1 < p0 when p0 > 0.500 depending on k and p0.
8
● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●■
■
■
■
■
■
■
■
■
■
■
■
■
■
■
5 10 15 20
r
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Figure 1: Given p0 = 0.45 respective values of p1 are shown for r =
1, 2, 3, ..., 20 in case k = 1. Odd sizes yield always values lower than 0.45.
The larger the size, the larger the amplitude from 0.45. In contrast, even
sizes up to r = 14 yield values higher then 0.45. Contrary to odd sizes, the
larger the size, the smaller the amplitude from 0.45. From r = 16 and up
the behavior is similar to odd sizes.
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
p0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
p1
Figure 2: The vlaue p1 is shown as a function of p0 in the full range 0 ≤ p0 ≤ 1
for k = 1 and r = 4.
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3 Tipping points dynamics
Having calculated p1 from p0 using Eq. (1) we need to iterate the update to
account for an on going debate about a given issue. It means to calculate
successively p2 = PT (p1), p3 = PT (p2), ..., pn = PT (pn−1) for n consecutive
updates of opinions. Each update takes some amount of real time, which
depends on the intensity of the ongoing debate. The value of n is scaled
with the overall debate duration. In case of a vote the value of n can be
determined using a series of polls and the campaign duration from its launch
till the actual voting. At the voting what counts for A is to have pn >
1
2
to
win the election and pn <
1
2
for B to win.
To apprehend the associated dynamics and be able to make a prediction
ahead of the actual voting we need to study the attractor landscape which
underlines the dynamics of PT (p0) given by Eq. (1). Accordingly we solve
the so-called fixed-points equation
PT (p) = p, (7)
which always satisfies PT (0) = 0 and PT (1) = 1 as could be expected. No
spontaneous formation of choices is included in the model. To determine the
respective stabilities of these two fixed points pB = 0 and pA = 1 we need to
calculate
λT (p) ≡ dPT (p)
dp
|p. (8)
The fixed point is stable when λT (p) < 1 and unstable for λT (p) > 1. Eq.
(8) gives
λr(p) =
r∑
m= r+1
2
(m− rp)
(
r
m
)
pm−1(1− p)r−m−1 , (9)
for odd sizes (Eq. (3)) and
λr(p) =
r∑
m= r
2
+1
(m− rp)
(
r
m
)
pm−1(1− p)r−m−1
+ k(1− 2p)r
2
(
r
r
2
)
p
r
2
−1(1− p) r2−1 , (10)
for even sizes (Eq. (4)).
For both odd and even sizes we always have λT (0) = λT (1) = 0, which
shows that both fixed points are stable. They are the attractors of the
10
Table 2: Variation of λr(pc) as function the local group size with r =
3, 5, 7, 9, 15, 101, 1001. It is always larger than 1 making the fixed point pc =
1
2
unstable.
r 3 5 7 9 15 101 1001
λr(pc) 1.5 1.87 2.19 2.46 3.14 8.04 25.25
opinion dynamics, which thus implies the existence of a tipping point, i.e.,
an unstable fixed point pc in between them.
Eq. (7) is a polynomial equation of degree L as seen from Eq. (1). It
thus have L roots of which two have been identified as pB = 0 and pA = 1.
It is worth to stress that not every root is relevant to the actual opinion
dynamics. Indeed, two constraints must be satisfied with roots being real
and located between 0 and 1.
While a general analytical solving seems to be out of reach, at least for
me, restraining to odd sizes with Eq. (3) shows that pc =
1
2
is always a fixed
point. The associated stability is given by
λr(pc) =
1
2r−1
r∑
m= r+1
2
(2m− r)
(
r
m
)
, (11)
which can be reduced to
λr(pc) =
r
2r−1
(
r − 1
r−1
2
)
. (12)
Eq. (12) yields λr(pc) > 1 for any size with λ3(pc) =
3
2
at r = 3 to λr(pc)→√
2
pi
r√
r− 2
3
≈
√
2r
pi
for r ≫ 1 as seen in Table (2).
Therefore, pc =
1
2
is the tipping point of an opinion dynamics restricted
to discussing groups of odd size. Indeed, the result holds true for even sizes
provided k = 1
2
, which is a special case. Otherwise, when k 6= 1
2
, pc =
1
2
is
not a fixed point for even sizes and Eq. (7) has to be solved numerically.
The case r = 4 can be solved analytically with
pc,4,k =
1− 6k +√13− 36k + 36k2
6(1− 2k) , (13)
which yields pc,4,1 ≈ 0.232 and pc,4,0 ≈ 0.768.
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0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
pc,4,k
Figure 3: The tipping point pc,4,k from Eq. (13) as a function of k in the full
range 0 ≤ k ≤ 1. Arrows indicate the direction of the opinion drift as a result
of repeated local discussions. For 1
2
< k ≤ 1 a full region exists where an
initial A minority is turned majority thanks to the bias driven by the leading
prejudices of the social group. By reversed symmetry when 0 ≤ k < 1
2
the
leading prejudices are driven the opinion flow at the expense of A as seen
from the arrows.
Accordingly, when k = 1 opinion A needs to start with p0 > 0.232 to end
up being majority after a few updates as seen in Figure (2). In contrast, for
k = 0 opinion A must have p0 > 0.768 to preserve its majority status once a
debate is launched.
Figure (3) shows the variation of the tipping point pc,4,k from Eq. (13)
as a function the bias breaking k. For 1
2
< k ≤ 1 a full region exists where
an initial A minority is turned majority thanks to the bias driven by the
leading prejudices of the social group. The arrows indicate the direction
of the opinion drift as a result of repeated local discussions. By reversed
symmetry when 0 ≤ k < 1
2
the leading prejudices are driven the opinion flow
at the expense of A and the benefit of B.
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Figure 4: The function p1 = P4 from Eq. (6) as a function of k and p is
exhibited with both planes p1 =
1
2
and p1 = p. The intersection of last plane
and p1 = P4 determines the line of tipping points pc,4,k. It start at 0.232 at
k = 1 to end up at 0.768 for k = 0.
4 Counter intuitive dynamics: a general il-
lustration
To grasp fully the counter intuitive dynamics driven by democratic informal
small groups debates we now illustrate the model through one general illus-
tration with two cases. In the first case people are distributed within groups
of size r = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and only r = 1, 2, 3, 4 in the second case. Proportions
are equal with a1 = a2 = . . . = aL =
1
L
, i.e. 1
5
= 0.200 and 1
4
= 0.250
respectively.
When k = 1 associated tipping points are found to be pc,r1...5,1 = 0.278
and pc,r1...4,1 = 0.153. To win the public debate and cross fifty percent at the
election, opinion A must start from a minimum support p0 > 0.278 in the
first case and only p0 > 0.153 in the second case. It is the reverse situation
for opinion B with initial supports larger than 0.722 and 0.847. The situation
appears to be far more favorable for opinion A against B, which has almost
no chance to win the election once a debate has been taken place.
Accordingly an opinion which starts with a support below its tipping
point will eventually lose support along the on going informal discussions
13
Figure 5: Same as Figure (4) for p1 = PT from Eq. (1) with a1 = a2 = . . . =
aL =
1
L
, i.e. 1
5
= 0.200 (top) and 1
4
= 0.250 (bottom). The lines of tipping
points start respectively at 0.278 and 0.153 at k = 1 to end up at 0.722 and
0.847 for k = 0.
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among people. The instrumental question being then to determine if this
opinion is in tune or in contradiction with the current leading prejudice and
belief shared by the associated social group in order to identify which of the
two opposite tipping points is concerned.
At this stage it is importance to underline that the building of prejudice
and belief among a social group obeys a rather slow dynamics making them
fixed and constant during a public debate. The time rate of opinion dynamics
is indeed much more quicker of the order of days in contrast to prejudice and
belief for which typical time rate is of the order of years if not decades.
An opinion starting with a vey high support of individual choices is thus
scheduled to lose this support as soon as the debate is launched in case it is
in dissonance with the leading prejudice and belief. For instance p0 = 0.80
yields the series 0.789, 0.774, 0.756, 0.731, 0.699, 0.655, 0.595, 0.514, 0.408 for
9 successive updates using the distribution a1 = a2 = a3 = a4 =
1
4
= 0.250
at k = 0. A huge majority is turned minority due to the contradiction of the
choice with the leading prejudice and belief.
Within the same group setting an initial minority associated to k = 0
fades away quite rapidly as seen with p0 = 0.45 and the series 0.330, 0.200,
0.093, 0.032 for 4 updates.
5 The Trump paradoxical sesame
Trump candidacy is in contradiction with the leading prejudices and beliefs
of Republicans and Democrats as it was evidenced from all earlier analyses
about Trump candidacy.
Besides polarizing so called anti-system feeling Trump profiles did not
comply with the usual basic skills requested to become both the nominee
of the Republican party and the president of the United State. Therefore,
according to my model, even if he could crystalize some initial majority
support, this support should have weakened progressively making Trump lose
many of the series of intermediate elections to eventually loose the Republican
nomination.
Such a faith is in agreement with most analyses, which had concluded
Trump was vowed to lose the run for Republican nomination. He was por-
trayed as a political bubble aimed at a rather quick collapse.
It is of importance to underline that among his Republican supporters
many were asking him to reverse such a provocative path, which should nec-
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essarily make him lose. Analysts would suggest to build a more respectable
and experienced image to fit the standards of a solid candidate to the presi-
dential run.
And here come the rationale of Trump apparent irrational attitude. At
least according to my analysis. Instead of trying to win voter support before
most local election he kept on going frontally against the voter values getting
them infuriated. He thus lost many of his supporters.
At this moment the move sounds totally counter-productive and even
suicidal. And indeed, the first outcome of such a move is effectively to erode
substantially Trump support. However at this very moment the sesame of
Trump phenomenon appears in its powerful mechanics deploying itself in a
threefold process.
(i) The process which gets people infuriated activates at the same time the
underlying associated prejudice, which were present but frozen. This
activation upsets the current balance of shared prejudice and common
belief of the social group at the benefit of the newly activated belief.
Within our framework, it turns k from zero to one.
(ii) Being infuriated by a shocking statement, people want to prove to them-
selves and to their peers that they reject the statement and thus do en-
gage into a fierce debate. By so doing the opinion dynamics is launched
driven by the new leading prejudice, which is precisely the one people
are departing from on a rational basis. They will not vote for Trump.
(iii) However within even size groups ties occur making the corresponding
group to doubt about which choice to select. A collective doubt is built
from a rational confrontation of opposite arguments. At this stage the
group eventually does chose Trump driven by the unconscious activated
prejudice, without having to formally identify with the prejudice.
We illustrate this unanticipated spin-off of the shocking statement by
considering an initial support p0 = 0.65 as exhibited in Figure (6). We assume
without loss of generality the case of group distribution L = 4, i.e., groups of
size r = 1, 2, 3, 4 with equal proportions a1 = a2 = a3 = a4 =
1
4
= 0.250. The
dynamics is initiated with k = 0 and leads to p1 = 0.588, p2 = 0.505, p3 =
0.397 for 3 successive updates. The support weakens since the tipping point
is located at p0 < pc,r1...4,0 = 0.847.
At this moment Trump makes a shocking statement and consequently
lose a good part of his supporters now down let say to p3 = 0.160. This
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rescaling of p3 is driven by a series of individual reaction of supporters. It is
not the result of discussions among agents.
Once the support p3 has been rescaled down, the balance of prejudice
is also reset at Trump’s benefit with k = 1 instead of k = 0. The debate
resumes but since p3 = 0.160 > pc,r1...4,1 = 0.153, the support starts to grow.
The increase is very slow during the first series of updates till some range
where it starts jumping to cross the winning value of 50% as seen from in
Figure (6).
Nevertheless, above reversing of opinion trend is not guaranteed for any
configurations. Some cases can be sensitive to small support differences. For
instance, consider the case L = 6 with a1 = 0.10, a2 = 0.30, a3 = 0.20, a4 =
0.30, a5 = 0.05, a6 = 0.05. It yields pc,r1...6,0 = 0.837 and pc,r1...6,1 = 0.163.
Starting from the same initial support p0 = 0.65 leads now to p1 = 0.575, p2 =
0.465, p3 = 0.315 for 3 successive updates. Results are similar to above case.
Rescaling p3 = 0.315 down to p3 = 0.164 produces also a similar behavior
as above. Results are shown in left part of Figure (7). However, if the falling
down of support driven by the shocking statement is a little bit bigger down
to p3 = 0.162 the overall dynamics is put up side down as illustrated in the
right part of Figure (7). There, Trump does lose since his after statement
support went below the tipping point. While the reversal process is overall
quite robust, it could turn fragile in the vicinity of the tipping point.
6 Will Trump be the next US president?
Not too many had foreseen Donald Trump gaining the Republican party
nomination and the same vision is prevailing for the November, 2016 US
Presidential election. Strengthened by polls giving a substantial gap in favor
to Hillary Clinton, most analysts reiterate their previous wrong forecast of
Trump defeat. What should have happen during the campaign for the party
nomination will finally occur for the presidential election.
From above analysis I would rather state that Trump victory is still
sound despite the negative polls. However to reiterate his nomination success
Trump needs to modify the targeted prejudices that have been reactivated
during the campaign. Before he had to address to leading frozen prejudices
and beliefs which more specific to Republican oriented people and he did.
Now, if keeping along the same spectrum he is doomed to fail since the
shocking statement could shift k from zero to values in the vicinity of k ≈ 1
2
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Figure 6: Values pn = PT (pn−1) using Eq. (1) for the case L = 4, i.e., groups
of size r = 1, 2, 3, 4 with equal proportions a1 = a2 = a3 = a4 =
1
4
= 0.250.
Tipping points are 0.847, 0.153 for respectively k = 0, 1. Here p0 = 0.65.
The first regime is with k = 0. After 3 updatesp3 = 0.397. At this moment
Trump makes a shocking statement which drives p3 down to 0.160. This
shift is not produced by discussions but by individual changes of opinion.
Simultaneously to the support decrease, the shocking statement activates a
prejudice associated to the statement nature and provokes a debate fueled
by infuriated people. And here comes the ”miracle” or the ”catastrophe”
depending on people political side, the support starts to increases first slowly
with p4 = 0.160, p5 = 0.163, p6 = 0.165, . . . and then accelerates with p18 =
0.311, . . . , p21 = 0.511, p22 = 0.623, p23 = 0.752.
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Figure 7: Same as Figure (6) with small but critical changes. The discussion
group distribution is given by a1 = 0.10, a2 = 0.30, a3 = 0.20, a4 = 0.30, a5 =
0.05, a6 = 0.05 with L = 6. Associated tipping points are pc,r1...6,0 = 0.837
and pc,r1...6,1 = 0.163. initial support is still p0 = 0.65. Opinion dynamics
is first taking place with k = 0 leading after 3 updates to p1 = 0.575, p2 =
0.465, p3 = 0.315. The shocking statement is made at the same moment as
before but now rescaled down to p3 = 0.164 in the left part and to p3 = 0.162
in the right part. From there, opinion dynamics takes place with k = 1 for
both cases. While in the left part, the evolution is similar to that of Figure
(6) since p3 > pc,r1...6,1 with Trump victory, it is opposite on the right part
with p3 < pc,r1...6,1 and Trump defeat.
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but certainly not k = 1. To reiterate the k = 1 shift requires to activate
frozen prejudices which are shared by all Americans both Democrats and
Republicans. At the same time to adopt a most respectable attitude will
make him lose for sure as it would have done for the Republican nomination.
7 Conclusion
The sesame of the Trump campaign can be summarized as follows. By shock-
ing the potential electors, who thus start to be against him, Trump activates
frozen prejudices, which in turn decrease the threshold value at his bene-
fit. On this basis, once the debate is launched, driven by the occurrence of
collective local doubts, hostile people will shift their stand to end up sup-
porting Trump. They do not need to endorse the shocking statement. On
the contrary, they have even expressed their rejection of the statement.
In other terms Trump victory relies on both the existence of a tiny minor-
ity of openly prejudiced people and a large majority of anti-prejudice people
who got somewhere hidden and locked in their values this very prejudice
component, which they got in a fuzzy and unclear path during their rising
childhood.
To conclude, I have provided unanticipated Trump phenomenon with a
model, the Local Majority Rule (LMR) model, which provides an explana-
tion to his success in gaining the Republican party nomination to run for the
2016, November presidential election. Moreover the model allows a predic-
tion about the November outcome which depends on the path Trump will
reposition his shocking targets. He must activate frozen prejudices which are
common to a majority of both Republican and Democrats.
At this stage, to avoid all kinds of misleading future comments about this
work, it is of importance to make a series of clarification points:
1. In case Donald Trump becomes the next US president, it will not be
the definite proof of the rightness of the model. Indeed, it will support
the legitimacy of the sociophysics approach and will demonstrate its
powerful potential in the building of a hard part of social science.
2. In case Donald Trump becomes the next US president, it is of impor-
tance to state that it would not have been a yes or no prediction with
fifty percent chance of success. That would dismiss the significance the
20
model prediction. At this moment, at the end of August, 2016, accord-
ing to polls and most analyses the election of Trump next November is
rather improbable.
3. In case Donald Trump does not become the next US president, it
will not disqualify the sociophysics approach. We are building a novel
framework to explain collective phenomena in social and political sci-
ences. A hard science is built along making predictions to check the
validity of the models. Both successful and wrong predictions con-
tribute to the elaboration of a solid and robust predictive tool. A path,
which will definitively takes a long time.
4. The prediction is falsifiable and it should be to clearly enlighten the
scientific nature approach of sociophysics.
5. The numbers given and obtained to illustrate the model should not
taken as precise predictions. What matters are the various trends which
have been singled out.
Last but not least, it is worth to stress that this work does not intend
to express any personal political view. It aims at taking advantage of a real
social event to try to discover the hidden laws, if they exist, which drive
human behavior, at least part of it.
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank Surajit Sen and Anatoly Frenkel for inviting me to give
a Colloquium at the physics departments of respectively SUNY University of
Buffalo (03/31/2016) and Yeshiva University (05/4/2016). I had a chance to
present my Local Majority Rule (LMR) model of opinion dynamics, which
predicted the Trump nomination victory. My conclusion was received with
great skepticism from both audiences.
References
[1] S. Galam, Sociophysics: A Physicist’s Modeling of Psycho-political Phe-
nomena (Springer, 2012).
21
[2] S. Galam, Sociophysics: a review of Galam models, Int. J. Mod. Phys. C
(2008) 409–440.
[3] S. Galam, Majority rule, hierarchical structures and democratic totali-
tarism: a statistical approach, J. of Math. Psychology 30 (1986) 426–434.
[4] S. Galam, B. Chopard, A. Masselot and M. Droz, Competing Species
Dynamics, Eur. Phys. J. B 4 (1998) 529-531.
[5] S. Galam, Minority Opinion Spreading in Random Geometry, Eur. Phys.
J. B 25 Rapid Note (2002) 403-406.
[6] S. Galam, The dynamics of minority opinion in democratic debate, Phys.
A 336 (2004) 56–62.
[7] S. Galam, Heterogeneous beliefs, segregation, and extremism in the mak-
ing of public opinions. Physical Review E 71 046123 (2005)
[8] C. Castellano, S. Fortunato and V. Loreto, Statistical physics of social
dynamics, Rev. Mod. Phys. 81 (2009) 591–646.
[9] B. K. Chakrabarti, A. Chakraborti and A. Chatterjee (Eds.), Econo-
physics and Sociophysics: Trends and Perspectives (Wiley-VCH Verlag,
2006).
[10] P. Singh, S. Sreenivasan, B. K. Szymanski, and G. Korniss, Competing
effects of social balance and influence, Phys. Rev. E 93 (2016) 042306.
[11] T. Cheon and J. Morimoto, Balancer effects in opinion dynamics, Phys.
Lett. A 380 (2016) 429–434.
[12] P. Siedlecki, J. Szwabi?ski and T. Weron, The interplay between con-
formity and anticonformity and its polarizing effect on society, arXiv
1603.07556 (2016).
[13] A. M. Calvo, M. Ramos and C. Anteneodo, Role of the plurality rule in
multiple choices, J. Stat. Mech. 2016 (2016) 023405.
[14] E. Lee, P. Holme and S. H. Lee, Modeling the dynamics of dissent ,
arXiv 1603.01980v2 (2016).
22
[15] G. Weisbuch, From Anti-Conformism to Extremism, J. of Artificial So-
cieties and Social Simulation 18 (3) 1 (2015).
[16] N. Crokidakis and P. M. C. de Oliveira, Inflexibility and independence:
Phase transitions in the majority-rule model, Phys. Rev. E 92 (2015)
062122.
[17] F. Bagnoli and R. Rechtman, Bifurcations in models of a society of
reasonable contrarians and conformists, Phys. Rev. E 92 (2015) 042913.
[18] G. Carbone and I. Giannoccaro, Model of human collective decision-
making in complex environments, Eur. Phys; J. B 88 (2015) 339.
[19] K. Sznajd-Weron, J. Szwabin´ski and R. Weron, Is the Person-Situation
Debate Important for Agent-Based Modeling and Vice-Versa?, PLoS
ONE 9 (2014) e112203.
[20] A. Chacoma and D. H. Zanette, Critical phenomena in the spreading of
opinion consensus and disagreement, Papers in Physics 6 (2014) 060003.
[21] S. Goncalves, M. F.,Laguna and J. R. Iglesias, Why, when, and how fast
innovations are adopted, Eur. Phys. J. B 85 (2012) 192.
[22] M. Mobilia, Fixation and polarization in a three-species opinion dynam-
ics model, Eur. Phys. Lett. 95 (2011) 50002.
[23] A. Ellero, G. Fasano A. Sorato, A modified Galams model for word-of-
mouth information exchange, Phys. A 388 (2009) 3901–3910
[24] A. C. R. Martins, Mobility and Social Network Effects on Extremist
Opinions, Phys. Rev. E 78 (2008) 036104.
[25] R. Lambiotte and M. Ausloos, Coexistence of opposite opinions in a
network with communities, J. Stat. Mech. (2007) P08026.
[26] M. A. Javarone, Networks strategies in election campaigns, J. Stat.
Mech. P08013 (2014).
[27] G. Ajmone Marsan, N. Bellomo, L. Gibelli, Stochastic evolutionary dif-
ferential games toward a systems theory of behavioral social dynamics,
Math. Models and Meth. in Appl. Sciences 26 (2016) 1051–1093.
23
[28] N. Lanchier and N. Taylor, Galam’s bottom-up hierarchical system and
public debate model revisited, Adv. Appl. Prob. 47 (2013) 668–692.
[29] S. Galam, The September 11 attack: A percolation of individual passive
support. European Physical Journal B 26 Rapid Note (2002) 269–272.
[30] S.Galam, Global physics: from percolation to terrorism, guerrilla war-
fare and clandestine activities, Physica A 330 (2003) 139–149.
[31] S. Galam and A. Mauger, On reducing terrorism power: a hint from
physics, Physica A 323 (2003) 695–704.
[32] B.Podobniketal, The Cost of Attack in Competing Networks, J. the
Royal Society Interface 12 (2015) 20150770.
[33] L. Shanahan and S. Sen, Agent based modeling of a surprise attack by
intruders: can the defenders win?, Mod. Phys. Lett. B 25 (2011) 2279–
2287.
[34] A. Westley et al, in this issue, (2016).
[35] Sociophysics: a personal testimony, Phys. A 336 (2002) 1375–1385.
[36] S. Galam, Contrarian deterministic effects on opinion dynamics, the
hung elections scenario. Physica A 333 (2004) 453.
[37] P. Lehir, Les mathe´matiques sinvitent dans le de´bat europe´en (interview
S. Galam), Le Monde 26/02 (2005) 23.
[38] S. Galam, Crier, mais pourquoi, Libe´ration 17/04 (1998) 6.
[39] S. Galam, From 2000 Bush-Gore to 2006 Italian elections: voting at
fifty-fifty and the contrarian effect, Qual. & Quant. 41 (2007) 579–589.
24
